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One-sentence summary: The violation of Bell inequalities rules out the straw man class of classical particle 
property models but leaves untouched the more significant class of classical random field models. 
Abstract: The violation of Bell inequalities by experiment has convinced physicists that we cannot maintain a classical view of the 
world. When we argue against the possibility of local realist hidden-variable models, however, the ubiquitous requirement of 
realism, that “measurement results depend on pre-existing properties of objects that are independent of the measurement”
×
, 
reduces classical theory to a straw man. When our most successful physical theories have been field theories for well over a century, 
and probabilistic for almost as long, the proper comparison is between quantum fields and random fields, for which there are no 
sharply defined objects and no properties, so that realism is inapplicable. If we model quantum fluctuations explicitly, we can 
construct random field models as alternatives to quantum field models. 
Bell's first construction of an inequality that 
must be satisfied by a local realistic theory
1
 
was refined to apply to classical field theories 
by considering probability densities for 
events which occur in spatially separated 
regions of space-time
2
, with a few tricky 
issues tidied up later
3
. Bell emphasizes his 
belief that this argument applies to classical 
fields, not just to particle property models, in 
Ref. 4. Essentially
5
, in order for the 
observations of a classical field that we make 
now to be rather unusual — in the sense that 
local realistic hidden-variable models cannot 
account for them — the classical field would 
also have to be rather unusual in the past. It is 
usually said, pejoratively, that a “conspiracy” 
is required, however classical local field 
models are possible, it is just that the past has 
to be unusual for the present to be unusual. 
A straightforward classical field theory is 
not mathematically adequate for modern 
physics because it does not include 
probabilities, which are needed to model the 
statistics of experimental results. Bell 
introduces, in Ref. 2, what he calls a theory 
of “beables”, which he supposes to be a 
classical statistical theory; however, a well-
defined elementary mathematical object, a 
random field, is adequate for his 
mathematical needs and does not have any 
awkward ontological connotations. A 
random field is an indexed set of random 
variables, the elementary building blocks of 
mathematical probability theory. The index 
set can be as simple as {1,2}, representing 
two dice, say, but the physically interesting 
case is an index set of functions on space-
time, which gives us a continuous random 
field. A quantum field can be presented as a 
set of measurement operators indexed by a 
set of functions on space-time; following that 
lead, a continuous random field can be 
presented as a commutative quantum field. 
There is a substantial logical difference 
between a local random field model and a 
local realistic hidden-variable model. For a 
local random field model, each measurement 
event is determined by the physical state of 
the whole experimental apparatus, whereas 
for a local realistic hidden-variable model 
measurement results are determined by a 
point source from which two objects are 
transmitted. There are no sharply defined 
pre-existing objects and properties in a 
random field model to cause measurement 
events and correlations between them, which 
are instead caused by correlations of the 
random field and the detailed statistical 
mechanics of the experimental apparatus and 
the actions and reactions between them. A 
continuous random field model is contextual 
just because the whole experimental 
apparatus must be modeled. 
If the unusual past that is required is 
thought unreasonable, then quantum field 
theory has the same problem. Suppose we 
construct a quantum field state that models 
the whole of an experimental apparatus that 
violates Bell inequalities and operators that 
model statistics of the experimental results. 
For a sophisticated experiment such as that of 
Weihs et al.
6
, which satisfies most physicists 
that local realistic hidden-variable models are 
essentially untenable
7
, part of the 
experimental results are the settings of the 
polarizers that determine what measurements 
are made; in a detailed model, the 
measurement settings are measurement 
results, manifestly so in the case of Weihs et 
al.'s experiment, and should be modeled as 
well as measurements that are more 
obviously called “results”. It may seem 
excessive to require of a quantum model that 
the measurement apparatus must be modeled 
as well as the system that is measured, when 
a simple appeal to symmetries of the 
experiment and some standard quantum 
mechanical calculations yield quite good 
agreement with experiment, but a detailed 
model of the thermodynamics of detectors is 
a necessary aim of quantum field theory if it 
is to be taken seriously as a more-or-less 
universal theory. Such a requirement is 
expressed, for example, by Feynman and 
Hibbs, 
“The usual separation of observer and 
observed which is now needed in 
analyzing measurements in quantum 
mechanics should not really be 
necessary, or at least should be even 
more thoroughly analyzed. What seems 
to be needed is the statistical mechanics 
of amplifying apparatus” 8. 
Once we construct a quantum field state for a 
complete experiment, it models not only 
statistics of the measurement results we 
observe, but also what statistics of other 
measurement results we would observe if we 
were to make different measurements, at 
earlier times, which would always prefigure 
the actual measurement statistics we obtain. 
Hence, unusual statistics of measurement 
results now no less entail unusual statistics of 
measurement results in the past and in the 
future for a quantum field model than they do 
for a classical random field model. 
One concern that Bell and some subsequent 
authors have emphasized is that the 
experimenter should be able to make free 
choices of what measurements will be made 
(although many physicists react strongly 
against the idea that an effective physical 
model should be required to include the 
experimenter). Classical deterministic models 
for biological systems might prevent the free 
will of the experimenter, but a model of 
statistical measures of the choices an 
experimenter makes does not impinge on 
their free will for each individual choice. In 
any case, a comprehensive quantum field 
model for a Bell inequality-violating 
experiment models the statistics of 
measurement settings — the polarizer 
settings in Weihs et al.'s experiment — no 
more or less than a random field model 
(which, recall, can be presented as a 
commutative quantum field), so again this is 
a problem for a quantum field model as much 
as for a random field model. 
An important feature of random field 
models for experiments in which quantum 
effects are significant is the natural 
appearance of quantum fluctuations. In the 
random field context quantum fluctuations 
are differentiated in a fundamental way, by 
Lorentz invariance, from thermal 
fluctuations
9
. The amplitude of quantum 
fluctuations is determined by Planck's 
constant, just as the amplitude of thermal 
fluctuations is determined by temperature. A 
fundamental consequence of the explicit 
presence of quantum fluctuations in a 
random field formalism is the concept of a 
thermodynamic dual of the amplitude of 
quantum fluctuations, analogously to the 
concept of entropy as a thermodynamic dual 
of the amplitude of thermal fluctuations; the 
interplay of quantum and thermal entropy is 
accounted for implicitly in existing physical 
The straw man of quantum physics 2 
Random fields. We cannot in general 
measure a quantum field or a continuous 
random field at a point unless we are willing 
to talk in mathematically undefined terms 
— when we could say that the field at a 
point is almost always ±∞ — but we can 
measure the field averaged over a small 
region of space-time, with a weight function 
f, to give a set of operators Φf indexed by 
weight functions (which are called test 
functions). These weighted averages of 
field values that can loosely be thought of 
as ±∞ at a point are finite [more properly, Φ 
is a linear functional of test functions f to 
operators Φf ; there is no infinite field at a 
point in the theory, there are only finite 
observations of Φf ].  The essential 
difference between a quantum field and a 
continuous random field, from which all 
other differences follow, is that Φf and Φg, 
for different test functions f and g, may be 
incompatible observables for a quantum 
field but are always compatible for a 
continuous random field. This difference of 
incompatibility or compatibility of measure-
ments is significant and is the basis of a 
long-running critique of the idea that the 
violation of Bell inequalities is about 
locality
10,11,12
. 
arguments in the quantum field context, 
whereas the interplay must be explicit in a 
random field formalism. Random fields have 
a general requirement to model the effects of 
quantum fluctuations explicitly, which can be 
alternately useful or a hindrance. No-one will 
stop using quantum fields and quantum 
mechanics whenever that is easier to do, but 
we can understand quantum theory by 
understanding the relationship between 
quantum fields and classical random fields, 
which is easier than understanding the 
relationship between quantum mechanics and 
classical particle property models. 
We should think of Feynman and Hibbs’ 
“amplifying apparatus” as sensitive 
apparatus, not as detection or measurement 
devices or apparatus: it is by now well-
established that we are best not to think in 
terms of systems, objects, or particles that 
exist independently and can be “detected” or 
“measured”. A “sensitive apparatus” is a 
thermodynamic system that is delicately 
engineered in a rest, metastable state, ready 
to make a transition to a different, 
precipitated state that can be observed 
macroscopically. Even when the sensitive 
apparatus is completely isolated, there will be 
a “dark-rate” of thermodynamic transitions; 
when the sensitive apparatus is placed near 
other experimental apparatus, the average 
rate and other statistics of the transitions will 
change, differently for different kinds and 
geometries of the whole apparatus. 
There are many different kinds of sensitive 
apparatus. A photographic plate, for example, 
has no feedback loop to return the 
precipitated state to the ready state, which 
would make statistics awkward if we could 
not construct a large-scale structure of many 
small, effectively isolated thermodynamic 
systems that are all in the ready state. 
Semiconductor detectors are carefully 
engineered to be very small, numerous, with 
“dead-times” (when the sensitive apparatus is 
not in the ready state) that are as small as 
possible, and with sensitivities tuned, as far 
as possible, to electromagnetic, electronic, 
muonic, or other fields. We say that the field 
causes the events, but the field and the 
sensitive apparatus are both required. 
Despite the constant fine-grained 
transitions of the sensitive apparatus, many 
classic experiments are engineered to be in a 
coarse-grained equilibrium state, in the sense 
that statistics of observed events do not vary 
over time. For an experimental apparatus that 
is in a coarse-grained equilibrium of the field, 
the field and the statistics of the observed 
events are globally determined by the whole 
experimental apparatus. Changing any part of 
the apparatus — and waiting for equilibrium 
to be re-established — will change the 
observed statistics of events. This classical 
understanding agrees naturally and firmly 
with the insistence of the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics that the 
whole apparatus affects the results that will 
be obtained, an idea that is not natural to 
particle-oriented approaches. This 
understanding also agrees with Bell’s 
polemic, “Against ‘measurement’
 
”
13
, which 
emphasizes the role of the whole experiment 
and the difficulties of talking about systems, 
objects, or particles and measurement of their 
properties. 
The stumbling blocks for classical particle 
property models for Bell inequality-violating 
experiments have typically been their 
mathematically ad-hoc nature, nonlocality, 
contextuality, or the lack of a Lorentz 
invariant formalism, which certainly make 
them poor in comparison with quantum 
mechanics and quantum field theory. 
Quantum field theory, however, is notorious 
for its need for renormalization, which is a 
mathematically dubious enough procedure 
that no rigorous interacting quantum field 
models are known in Minkowski space. It 
has been shown recently, however, that a 
large class of rigorous interacting continuous 
random fields can be constructed in a Lorentz 
invariant formalism
14
 — because a 
commutative algebraic structure is less 
confining than algebraic constraints on 
quantum fields — making the mathematics 
of quantum fields, in this respect, poor in 
comparison to the mathematics of random 
fields. 
Renormalization is a first reason to justify 
the use of random fields. Secondly, although 
accommodations to the measurement 
problem are by now natural enough that they 
are of little concern in our daily use of 
quantum mechanics, the construction of 
random field models would also lessen 
interpretational issues. Thirdly, quantum 
gravity has to some extent stumbled on the 
conceptual mismatch between quantum field 
theory and classical general relativity
15
, a 
mismatch that is reduced if we adopt the use 
of random fields, although the probabilistic 
aspect that is introduced to classical models 
by random fields may well cause as many 
technical difficulties as we find in quantum 
gravity. 
There are several existing classes of models 
that to varying degrees may be understood to 
be random fields, including those of Adler
16
, 
’t Hooft
17
, Khrennikov
18
, Morgan
14
, and 
Wolfram
19
, all of which have been relatively 
little pursued partly because they have been 
taken to be obviously in conflict with the 
violation of Bell inequalities. The 
mathematics of random fields is certainly 
very little developed as yet, but it is 
nonetheless time to put away the straw man 
of classical particle property models. 
email: peter.w.morgan@yale.edu 
homepage: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~PWM22 
                                                
× S. Gröblacher et al., An experimental test of non-
local realism. Nature 446, 871-875 (2007). 
1 J. S. Bell, On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, 
in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum 
Mechanics (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), pp14-21. 
2 J. S. Bell, The theory of local beables, in Speakable 
and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), pp52-62. 
3 J. S. Bell, Free variables and local causality, in 
Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), pp100-104. 
4 J. S. Bell, Bertlmann's socks and the nature of 
reality, in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum 
Mechanics (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), pp139-
158. 
5 P. Morgan, Bell inequalities for random fields. J. 
Phys. A 39, 7441-7445 (2006). 
6 G. Weihs et al., Violation of Bell’s inequality under 
strict Einstein locality conditions. Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 
5039-5043 (1998). 
7 A. Aspect, Bell’s inequality test: more ideal than 
ever. Nature 398, 189-190 (1999). 
8 R. P. Feynman, A. R. Hibbs, Quantum Mechanics 
and Path Integrals (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965), 
pp22-23. 
9 P. Morgan, A succinct presentation of the quantized 
Klein-Gordon field, and a similar quantum 
presentation of the classical Klein-Gordon random 
field. Phys. Lett. A 338, 8-12 (2005). 
10 W. M. de Muynck, The Bell inequalities and their 
irrelevance to the problem of locality in quantum 
mechanics. Phys. Lett. A 114, 65-67 (1986). 
11 L. J. Landau, On the violation of Bell's inequality in 
quantum theory. Phys. Lett. A 120, 54-56 (1987). 
12 R. F. Streater, Classical and quantum probability. J. 
Math. Phys. 41, 3556-3603 (2000). 
13 J. S. Bell, Against ‘measurement’, Physics World , 
33-40 (August 1990). 
14 P. Morgan, Lie fields revisited. J. Math. Phys. 48, 
122302 (2007). 
15 S. Carlip, Is quantum gravity necessary? Class. 
Quantum Grav. 25, 154010 (2008). 
16 S. Adler, Quantum theory as an emergent 
phenomenon (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2004). 
17 G. ’t Hooft, Quantum gravity as a dissipative 
deterministic system. Class. Quant. Grav. 16, 3263-
3279 (1999). 
18 A. Khrennikov, Quantum mechanics as an 
approximation of statistical mechanics for classical 
fields. Rep. Math. Phys. 60, 453-484 (2007). 
19 S. Wolfram, A New Kind of Science (Wolfram 
Media, Champaign, IL, 2002). 
